We use loan-level data to examine how large international banks reduced their crossborder lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Country, firm, and bank fixed effects allow us to disentangle credit supply and demand and to simultaneously control for the unobserved traits of banks and the countries and firms they lend to. We document substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which different banks retrenched from the same country. Banks reduced credit less to markets that were geographically close; where they were more experienced; where they operated a subsidiary; and where they were integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders. (JEL F36, F42, F52, G15, G28) 
International Bank Lending During a Financial Crisis
. Each bar indicates the number of destination countries that experienced a change in bank lending within the percentage bracket on the horizontal axis. For instance, there were 11 countries to which cross-border syndicated bank lending declined by between 25% and 50% while there were only five countries that experienced an increase in cross-border syndicated lending by between 25%−50%.
at home (Giannetti and Laeven 2012b) and hence somewhat insulated domestic borrowers from the crisis. 1 A pertinent question is how crisis-hit banks reduce cross-border credit when they focus more on domestic borrowers. The recent crisis, which originated in the United States but spilled over to much of the developed and developing world, provides an ideal testing ground to answer this question. Figure 1 depicts the substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the lending decline after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. While this partly reflects differences in the adjustment of credit demand, we will show that banks also systematically varied their credit-supply response across countries. A better understanding of such patterns is important as sudden declines in the supply of cross-border credit can harm local industries that depend on external finance (Cowan and Raddatz 2011) .
To structure our discussion, we start by outlining two retrenchment scenarios. In the first scenario, crisis-hit banks follow very similar patterns when deleveraging abroad. Any given destination country will therefore observe few
The Review of Financial Studies / v 26 n 1 2013 differences between its cross-border lenders: they more or less retrench to the same extent. Such a general "run for the exit" may reflect that an increase in economic uncertainty triggered banks to retreat into their domestic shell by reducing cross-border credit across the board (Forbes and Warnock 2012) . Alternatively, banks may have recalibrated their credit supply on the basis of broad destination-country characteristics that are equal to all lenders, such as political or macroeconomic risks. The key feature of this first scenario is that there is little within-country variation in the extent to which banks reduced cross-border lending during the crisis.
In the second scenario there is no generalized run for the exit. Deleveraging banks instead differentiate on the basis of characteristics that are specific to bank-country pairs. Banks compare the "franchise" value of future crossborder lending to determine where to retrench more and where to reduce credit less. Theory suggests that the closeness of a bank to a destination country plays an important role in this assessment. Banks find it easier to overcome information asymmetries when they are closer to borrowers (Hauswald and Marquez 2006) , and this becomes especially important when default risk increases during a crisis (Ruckes 2004) . In countries where a bank has established lending relationships, it may also possess local market power (Degryse and Ongena 2005) , an advantage it can exploit during a crisis. In addition, banks with significant experience in a country can lend at lower costs as they know the local business sector well, know more domestic banks they can co-lend with, and are familiar with the legal, institutional, and accounting environment. Therefore, in this second scenario banks withdraw less from countries that are relatively "close" in a geographic sense or in terms of lending relationships.
In this paper we take both scenarios to data on cross-border syndicated lending to assess which retrenchment scenario describes the empirical patterns after the collapse of Lehman Brothers the best. Syndicates-groups of financial institutions that jointly provide large loans to corporate borrowers-are one of the main channels of cross-border debt finance to developed countries and emerging markets. In 2007, international syndicated loans made up over 40% of all cross-border debt funding of U.S. borrowers and more than two-thirds of cross-border flows to emerging markets. 2 This paper concentrates on the 117 largest banks in the cross-border syndications market, which jointly have a market share of over 95%. We use information on individual loans to construct for each of these banks a snapshot of their pre-and post-crisis lending to each destination country.
We explain the stability of cross-border lending through a set of variables that measure how close banks are to corporate borrowers. We observe multiple banks that lend to one and the same country (or firm), and this plays a crucial part in our identification. It allows us to focus on variables specific to bankcountry or bank-firm pairs and to empirically isolate the relationship between bank-borrower closeness and cross-border lending stability. In particular, by controlling for changes in credit demand and other unobserved country-level heterogeneity through country fixed effects, we can analyze how different banks change their lending to the same country differently (within-country comparison). We replicate this approach at the firm level using firm fixed effects (see Khwaja and Mian 2008) . In both cases we also use bank fixed effects to analyze how a particular bank-given a certain funding shock-changes its lending to different countries or firms differently (within-bank comparison) .
Using this identification strategy we show that during the financial crisis international banks did not cut cross-border lending in an indiscriminate manner: there was no overall run for the exit. Instead, and in line with our second scenario, bank-borrower closeness was strongly related to the resilience of cross-border credit. Banks continued to lend more to countries that were geographically close, where they were integrated in a network of domestic co-lenders, and where they had built up more lending experience. Banks that operated a local subsidiary were more stable providers of cross-border credit too, in particular in countries with weaker institutions. Our findings therefore suggest that deeper financial integration is associated with more stable cross-border credit during a crisis.
A paper closely related to ours is Giannetti and Laeven (2012b, henceforth GL) . GL also use data on syndicated loans and show that during crisis periods banks shift from foreign to domestic lending. They find that this increase in home bias is the result of a "flight home" rather than a "flight to quality," as borrowers of different quality are equally affected. Our results complement and qualify the main finding of GL in an important way. By studying the reallocation of banks' foreign portfolios after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, we find that banks do differentiate between foreign borrowers but that they do so on the basis of closeness dimensions that are specific to bank-borrower pairs. 3 While using the same database, methodologically our paper differs considerably from GL. While GL exploit a relatively long time dimension to link shocks to bank capital to changes in home bias, we instead focus specifically on the 2008-09 crisis and, through the use of bank fixed effects, abstract from the magnitude of shocks to individual banks. Second, we carefully distribute each loan over the actual providers of the funds instead of allocating the full loan to the lead arranger(s). This more laborious approach allows us to measure for each individual syndicate member the distance to each country, the experience it has in that country, the level of prior cooperation with domestic banks, and whether it has a subsidiary in the country.
Bank-borrower Closeness and the Stability of Cross-border Bank Lending
We aim to find out whether during a crisis different banks retrench to the same extent from destination countries (scenario 1) or whether the severity of the retrenchment depends on characteristics specific to bank-country pairs (scenario 2). In the second scenario, banks compare the "franchise" value of future cross-border lending across countries to determine where to retrench more and where to reduce credit less. Theory suggests that this value is higher in countries that are closer. In such countries, information asymmetries between banks and borrowers may be less severe while future operating costs will be lower and market power higher. The literature highlights four key aspects of bank-borrower closeness that can affect the franchise value of cross-border credit and may therefore be positively related to lending stability during a crisis. A first measure is the geographical distance between the bank and its borrowers. Banks may retrench more from distant countries if the screening and monitoring of borrowers becomes more important during a crisis (Ruckes 2004 ) and is more difficult for remote borrowers (Jaffee and Modigliani 1971; Hauswald and Marquez 2006) . 7 The transaction and enforcement costs of lending over large distances may be higher too. For instance, banks find it harder to bilaterally negotiate or successfully recover if a defaulting borrower is further away (Mian 2006) . For these reasons banks may cut lending more to firms in distant countries when they are triggered to reassess the attractiveness of lending across countries.
A second measure is the lending experience in a country. Through repeat lending banks reduce information asymmetries and build up proprietary information about borrowers (Rajan 1992; Boot 2000; Boot and Thakor 2000) . They can reuse this information when lending to the same borrower (Greenbaum and Thakor 1995) , and the more experienced banks become, the more they rely on this proprietary information (Agarwal and Hauswald 2010) . Experienced banks thus face lower variable lending costs and may be more inclined to continue lending during a crisis.
Lending experience also gives banks market power over their borrowers (Degryse and Ongena 2005) , which they can use to carve out local captive markets by creating adverse-selection problems for competitor banks (Dell'Ariccia 2001; Agarwal and Hauswald 2010) . In particular during a crisis, captive firms will have little opportunity to switch to another bank and banks can exploit this by charging higher interest rates. Banks will be particularly reluctant to withdraw from countries where they built up lending relationships that involve implicit long-term contracting in which they accept low interest rates in the short run in the expectation of more profitable lending in the long run (Sharpe 1990 ). For these reasons, a bank with previous lending experience can continue to supply credit at lower cost and higher margins compared to an inexperienced bank. The former may therefore consider a country to be of special importance, whereas the latter does not.
A third measure that indicates how close a bank is to its (potential) borrowers is whether it has established a local subsidiary. First, a presence on the ground means that loan officers are closer to (potential) borrowers. This may allow a bank to continue lending during uncertain times because screening and monitoring can be stepped up quite easily (Mian 2006) . Local staff can also help generate (and subsequently monitor) new cross-border deals. Second, banks with a subsidiary may have more local market power and this may provide them with an incentive to continue to lend during a crisis. Finally, the presence of a subsidiary may reveal a bank's strategic commitment to a country. Once a subsidiary is established and the associated entry costs are sunk, there may still be fixed costs associated with winding it down. 8 To the extent that local lending by the subsidiary and cross-border lending from the headquarters are complements, a bank's reluctance to close a subsidiary may also have a stabilizing impact on its cross-border lending to a country.
Yet, while a local subsidiary reduces the physical distance between loan officer and firm, it also creates a functional or hierarchical distance within the bank. Banks may experience difficulties in efficiently passing along (soft) information from the subsidiary to headquarters (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Stein 2002) . Indeed, Liberti and Mian (2009) find that when the hierarchical distance between the information-collecting agent and the manager that approves a loan is large, less "soft" or subjective and more "hard" information is used. Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2009) show for Italy that a greater functional distance between loan officers and headquarters adversely affects credit availability of local firms. Moreover, if the incentives of local officers are not aligned with those of the parent bank, internal agency costs may hamper cross-border lending as well (Scharfstein and Stein 2000) . Such costs increase with distance if parent banks find it more difficult to supervise management in faraway places (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000) . The presence of a subsidiary may hence be associated with more stable cross-border lending but only if the positive effect of local loan officers is not offset by higher within-bank information and agency costs due to an increased functional distance.
A fourth measure of bank-borrower closeness is the extent to which a bank cooperates with domestic banks. Banks may improve the information they have about new and existing foreign borrowers by cooperating with domestic banks that possess a comparative advantage in reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis local firms (Mian 2006; Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo 2007) . Domestic banks are not only geographically closer to these firms but also share a common language and culture. Moreover, they may have a more intimate knowledge of local legal, accounting, and other institutions and their impact on firms. 9 Information sharing with domestic banks may also reduce adverse-selection problems (Pagano and Jappelli 1993) , and through co-lending with domestic banks international banks may gradually increase their own knowledge of local firms. For these reasons we expect that international banks that are well integrated in a lending network of domestic banks are a more stable credit source during a crisis.
To examine whether different banks retrenched to different extents from one and the same country during the 2008-09 financial crisis, we proceed by testing whether bank-borrower closeness-measured as distance, lending experience, subsidiary presence, and cooperation with domestic banks-was correlated with changes in the credit supply of individual banks to individual countries.
Data and Econometric Methodology

Data
Our main data source is the Dealogic Loan Analytics database, which contains comprehensive information on virtually all syndicated loans since the 1980s. We download all syndicated loans that were extended to private borrowers worldwide during January 2000-September 2009 and split each loan into the portions provided by the syndicate members. Loan Analytics contains full information on loan breakdown for about 25% of all loans and for these loans we allocate the exact loan portions to the individual lenders. For the other 75%, we have to use a rule to allocate loan portions. For our baseline regressions, we use the simplest rule possible: we divide the loan equally among the syndicate members. Section 3.3 presents robustness tests that show that our results also hold when we allocate the 75% of the sample in other ways. For our main sample period, July 2006-September 2009, we split a total of 21,323 syndicated loans into 131,113 loan portions.
We then use these loan portions to reconstruct for each bank the country distribution of its cross-border lending. We define cross-border lending as loans where the nationality of the (parent) bank is different from the nationality of the borrower and where the loan is provided by the parent (Citibank lending from the U.S. to a Polish firm) rather than by a subsidiary (Citibank Poland participating in a loan to a Polish firm). Over 94% of cross-border lending is of the former type and therefore included in our data set. 10 Next, we identify all commercial, savings, cooperative, and investment banks that at the group level provided at least 0.01% of global syndicated crossborder credit and that participated in at least 20 cross-border loans in 2006. This leaves us with 117 banks from 36 countries, both advanced countries (75 banks) and emerging markets (42 banks). 11 Together these banks lent to firms in 59 countries and accounted for over 95% of all cross-border syndicated lending in 2006.
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 list all banks and destination countries in our sample. Table A1 also shows each bank's country of incorporation and its absolute and relative share of the market for cross-border syndicated lending. Most banks have a small pre-crisis market share, but there are a few big players, such as Deutsche Bank and Citigroup, with a share of over 3%. 12 For each bank we calculate both the volume and the number of crossborder lending to individual destination countries in the pre-crisis period (July 2006 -June 2007 Our first cross-sectional dependent variable is a dummy Sudden stop, which is one for each bank-country pair where a bank completely stopped lending during the crisis (but where it was active before). 13 Our second and third dependent variables, Volume and Number, are the log difference of (1 plus) the amount (number) of cross-border lending by a bank to a country between the postLehman Brothers (October 2008 -September 2009 ) and the pre-crisis period (July 2006 -June 2007 . To reduce the chance that our results are affected by outliers, we winsorize by setting the upper and lower tail values equal to the values of the 1 st and 99 th percentile for both Volume and Number. We also create a dependent variable at the bank-firm level. Here we use a sample of firms that borrowed from at least two banks in our sample before the crisis and borrowed at least once after the Lehman Brothers collapse. Exit is a dummy variable that is one in case a bank was lending to a particular firm before the crisis but was no longer among the syndicate members during the crisis. Table 1 shows that our data set includes 1,913 different bank-country pairs and 2,326 bank-firm pairs. On average an international bank was lending to firms in 16 different countries before the demise of Lehman Brothers. Banks reduced their lending on average by 52% to a destination country during the crisis. The variables Sudden stop and Exit indicate that banks even completely stopped lending to 44% (57%) of the countries (firms) they were lending to before the crisis.
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As discussed in Section 1, we create four variables that measure different aspects of bank-borrower closeness for all bank-country and bank-firm pairs (the Closeness variables in Table 1 ). We first use the great circle distance formula to calculate the geographical Distance between a bank's headquarters and its various countries of operation as the number of kilometers (in logs) between the capitals of both countries. The average Distance to a foreign borrower is 4,731 km, but there exists considerable variation (the standard deviation is 3,765 km). 14 Second, we create a measure of a bank's prior experience in syndicated lending to a country. Experience is the number of loans that a bank provided to a country since 2000 and that had matured by July 2006. This average number of prior loans is 36 and ranges between 0 and 2,277. At the firm level, a bank participated on average in two loans. We exclude loans still outstanding during the pre-crisis year in order to avoid a mechanical correlation with our dependent variable. Because the relationship between Experience and lending stability may be concave, we use the natural log.
Third, we link our banks to Bureau van Dijk's BankScope database to collect detailed information on their ownership structure. For each banking group we identify all majority-owned foreign bank subsidiaries. We create a dummy variable Subsidiary that is one in each country where a bank owns a subsidiary. A typical bank owns a subsidiary in three foreign countries, and in 18% of our bank-country pairs a subsidiary is present.
Fourth, we count for each bank and in each of its countries of operation the number of different domestic banks with which it has cooperated in a syndicate since 2000. The log of this number is the variable Domestic banks. On average a bank has worked with 16 different domestic banks in a country. Variation is large, however, with some banks never cooperating with domestic banks whereas others cooperate with dozens of different banks. Table A4 in the Appendix contains a pairwise correlation matrix of the closeness variables. The correlations are low to moderate, between −0.10 and 0.52. We are therefore confident that the variables provide sufficient independent information and that multicollinearity is not an issue.
Econometric methodology
To examine whether bank-borrower closeness is related to lending stability, we use the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous event that triggered a sudden stop in cross-border lending. We compare, in a cross-sectional setting, lending in the year after the Lehman Brothers collapse to lending in the year before the financial crisis. We then test whether the heterogeneity in this change in cross-border bank lending is associated with differences in banks' closeness to borrowers in various destination countries.
We use country fixed effects to focus on differences across banks within countries. A key advantage of this approach is that it allows us to neatly control for changes in credit demand at the country level. Here we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) , who control for credit demand at the firm level by using firm fixed effects in regressions based on a data set of firms that borrow from multiple banks [see Schnabl (2012) for a similar application]. Since our data set contains information on multiple banks that lend to the same country, we use country fixed effects to rigorously control for credit demand. This is important because the crisis hit the real economy of countries to a different extent and with a different lag. Firms' credit demand to finance working capital and investments was consequently affected to varying degrees. 15 The use of country fixed effects means that we do not speak to the question of whether banks in general retrenched more from certain types of countries, such as more risky ones. Instead, we exploit variation at the bank-country level to analyze whether two banks reduce lending to one and the same country to a different extent.
Since banks are active in multiple countries, we include bank fixed effects to control for bank-specific factors that might affect changes in lending. Whereas Khwaja and Mian (2008) include bank-level control variables alongside a bankspecific funding measure (their variable of interest), we prefer bank fixed effects because the combination of bank and country fixed effects allows us to focus on closeness variables that link bank i to country j . Our cross-sectional baseline specification is
where subscripts i and j denote banks and destination countries, respectively; β is a coefficient vector; C ij is a matrix of closeness variables; ε i and ϕ j are vectors of bank-and country-fixed effect coefficients, respectively; and η ij is the error term. L ij is either Sudden stop (a dummy that is one for each bankcountry pair where bank lending came to a complete halt during the crisis), or Volume or Number (the log change in lending by bank i to country j ). Second, we estimate firm-level regressions on a sample of firms that borrowed from at least two banks in our sample before the crisis and borrowed at least once after the Lehman Brothers collapse. The dependent variable Exit is the probability that bank i, a creditor of firm k before the crisis, was no longer among the syndicated lenders to firm k after the default of Lehman Brothers. We can now use firm-level fixed effects to control for changes in credit demand:
where subscripts i and k denote individual banks and firms, respectively; β is a coefficient vector; C ik is a matrix of closeness variables; ε i and ϕ k are vectors of bank and firm fixed effect coefficients, respectively; and η ik is the error term. E ik is an Exit dummy that is one if bank i stopped lending to firm k during the financial crisis and is zero otherwise. In all specifications, we control for Exposure, which measures for each bankcountry and bank-firm pair the number of outstanding syndicated loans as a percentage of the bank's total number of syndicated loans at the time of the Lehman Brothers collapse. On average this country Exposure was close to 5% of the bank's syndicated lending. We have no strong prior about the impact of this variable on lending stability. Banks may have adjusted lending more where they had high pre-crisis exposures, for instance because risk limits became more binding for such countries. On the other hand, banks may have retrenched more from "marginal" countries while staying put in core markets. In the Volume and Number regressions, we also control for the number of pre-crisis loans, so that our results are not driven by artificially large changes in the dependent variable in marginal countries.
We include the variable Arranger in all specifications. This dummy is 1 if the bank acted at least once as an arranger in a particular country or for a specific firm. A syndicate consists of two tiers: arrangers and participants. The arrangers comprise the senior tier and negotiate the terms with the borrower. They allocate a substantial part of the loan to a junior tier, the participants, who assume a more passive role. Arrangers usually act to some extent as delegated monitors for the participants (Sufi 2007) . We therefore expect that banks that previously arranged a loan for a client are relatively well informed. Arrangers may also be more stable lenders because they expect fee income from ancillary business, such as underwriting a future bond issue, as part of a longer-term relationship.
Finally, we include two bank-country pair control variables: Change trade and Change bank FDI. Change trade is the log change in total export plus import volume in U.S. dollars between the home country of bank i and destination countryj . Following Tinbergen (1962) , a voluminous literature has developed on gravity models that link trade flows to the distance between trading partners. Since stable trade relations may be associated with stable financial integration, we expect a positive relationship between Change trade and the stability of cross-border lending.
Our second country-pair variable, Change bank FDI, measures the log change in the year after the Lehman Brothers collapse in the number of banks from the home country of bank i that own a subsidiary in country j [based on information from Claessens and Van Horen (2011) ]. To the extent that financial FDI (foreign-bank ownership) and financial trade (crossborder lending) are complements (Brainard 1997) , we expect that a reduction in bilateral FDI would be associated with a decline in cross-border bank lending.
We use OLS to estimate the Volume and Number regressions and a linearprobability model for the Sudden stop and Exit regressions. 16 Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and double clustered by bank and country (firm). Table 2 presents the results of our country-and firm-level baseline specifications. We include our four closeness variables, as well as bank and destination country (or firm) fixed effects and the control variables, Exposure and Arranger. The first six columns show the specifications at the bank-country level and the last two columns those at the bank-firm level. In all regressions we include the bilateral controls Change trade and Change bank FDI, with the exception of columns 4-6 where we replace these with country-pair fixed effects. Even without the latter, we explain 45%, 36%, 63%, and 44% of the variation in Sudden stop, Volume, Number, and Exit, respectively.
Empirical Results
Baseline results
Our four closeness variables turn out to be strongly correlated with banklending stability during the financial crisis. This indicates that the severity of the retrenchment from a particular country differed between banks and depended on characteristics that were specific to each bank-country pair.
First, we find a significant and robust negative relationship between Distance and lending stability. The probability of a sudden stop increases with Distance to the destination country, and during the crisis banks continue to lend more to borrowers that are geographically close. Distance constraints are therefore not only negatively related to the amount of cross-border credit in tranquil times, as documented in earlier studies, but also with its stability. Based on column 1 in Table 2 , we estimate that a one-standard-deviation increase in Distance is linked to an increased probability of a sudden stop of 4.6 percentage points. In addition, column 2 shows that a 10% increase in Distance aggravates the decline in the amount of cross-border lending by almost 3%. This finding is in line with GL, who document that banks decrease lending to distant borrowers more when they experience a banking crisis in their home country.
Second, a bank's previous Experience with cross-border syndicated lending to a particular country is strongly and positively related to lending stability during the crisis. A one-standard-deviation increase in Experience is linked to a decrease in the probability of a Sudden stop by 8.2 percentage points (column 1 in Table 2 ). Furthermore, a 10% higher Experience level comes with a smaller decline in the cross-border lending Volume of almost 5% (column 2).
Third, we find that cross-border lending to countries where a bank owns a Subsidiary declines less than to countries where that same bank does not own an affiliate. The results in column 1 in Table 2 indicate that the probability of Table 2 Closeness and cross-border bank lending stability-Baseline results [2]
Country
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] a full lending stop is almost 5 percentage points lower when a bank owns a local affiliate, all else equal. Moreover, in countries where a bank operates a subsidiary, the amount of cross-border loans during the crisis is 28 percentage points higher. Fourth, we find that international banks that cooperate with many domestic banks are more stable sources of cross-border credit. The probability of a sudden stop is 11.7 percentage points less in case a bank's level of cooperation with domestic banks increases by one standard deviation. We find no impact of cooperation with Domestic banks on the Number or Volume of loans during the crisis.
As expected, we find that banks that previously operated at least once as an Arranger in a country prove to be more resilient during a crisis. There is an 11.3% lower probability that they completely cut lending to a country. We find no apparent link between a bank's outstanding Exposure to a country, expressed as a percentage of the total number of syndicated loans, and the change in lending after the fall of Lehman Brothers. 17 Finally, we find no clear relationship between our country-pair control variables Change trade and Change bank FDI and bank lending stability. 18 We combine country and bank fixed effects to focus on variables at the bankcountry level. Since these fixed effects capture (un)observed characteristics of banks and destination countries, concerns about omitted-variable bias should be limited. Such concerns are further attenuated by controlling for Change trade and Change bank FDI. Any possible bias must therefore stem from other omitted country-pair variables that are correlated with both our closeness variables and lending stability.
However, to alleviate any concerns about omitted-variable bias, we examine in columns 4-6 of Table 2 whether or not our results hold when we include country-pair fixed effects. We now compare banks from the same home country that operate in the same destination country. This prevents us from estimating the effect of geographical Distance. Adding bilateral fixed effects also substantially reduces data variation, making estimation more challenging. In order to estimate bilateral fixed effects, we need at least two different banks from the same home country that were lending to the same destination country before the crisis. Furthermore, given that the bilateral fixed effects take out the average across country pairs, we also require substantial variation in the remaining closeness variables among the banks in the same country pair. In our data, which cover over 95% of the international syndicated loan market, this variation is simply quite limited. In over 75% of the observations, less than five banks from the same country are active in the same destination country.
Columns 4-6 in Table 2 nevertheless show that our results hold up in this very restricted specification: lending stability is higher for experienced banks and banks that cooperate more with domestic banks. The coefficient for Subsidiary is imprecisely estimated, but this likely reflects the limited within-destination country variation among banks from the same home country.
So far our identification strategy has relied on controlling for changes in credit demand through country fixed effects. Although we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) , our approach is coarser as we apply it at a higher aggregation level (bank-country pairs instead of bank-firm pairs). If country fixed effects imperfectly control for changes in credit demand, this could bias our results if heterogeneity in credit demand at the firm or sector level would not be orthogonal to our closeness variables. To get around this issue, we analyze in columns 7-8 in Table 2 whether or not our closeness variables determine lending stability at the firm level as well. We now use fixed effects at the firm level and also measure Experience and Arranger at the firm level.
These firm-level regressions confirm our earlier findings. The probability that a pre-crisis lender is no longer part of the syndicate during the crisis increases if the firm is more distant, if the bank has not cooperated much with domestic banks, and if the bank does not have substantial lending experience with the firm. At the firm level we do not find an association between the presence of a local subsidiary and the likelihood that a bank continues to lend during the crisis.
The economic impact of our closeness variables remains significant too. A one-standard-deviation increase in Distance increases the probability that a bank is no longer part of the syndicate during the crisis by 3.3 percentage points. A one-standard-deviation increase in Experience decreases this probability by 8.9 percentage points. Finally, increasing the cooperation level with Domestic banks by one standard deviation reduces the probability that a bank is no longer a member of the syndicate by 11.0 percentage points.
To conclude, we uncover empirical patterns at both the bank-country and the bank-firm level that strongly favor our second retrenchment scenario. Crisis-hit banks clearly differed in the extent to which they retrenched from similar countries, and bank-borrower closeness, measured along a number of dimensions, is a defining characteristic of cross-border lending stability during a crisis.
Bank-borrower closeness and lending during normal
times: A placebo test We put forward the idea that bank-borrower closeness is associated with crossborder lending stability during a crisis. The results in Table 2 are in line with this, but it is possible that the strong relationship we find is not specific to our sample period. To be clear, we do not expect closeness to be irrelevant before the crisis. After all, there exists a sizeable literature on the impact of bank-borrower closeness on the quantity of bank lending and we cite the main contributions in Section 1. We expect instead that the importance of bank-borrower closeness increased during the crisis and that closeness explains a substantial part of the heterogeneity in the lending reversal.
To analyze the importance of our closeness variables before and during the crisis in more detail, we first perform a placebo test on out-of-sample data over July 2005-June 2007. This period ends just when the market for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) started to contract and the British bank Northern Rock experienced a run. We divide this "crisis-free" placebo period into two subperiods of equal length (July 2005 -June 2006 and July 2006 -June 2007 and calculate our four dependent variables by comparing the last with the first period. Our independent variables, such as Experience, are also recalculated over these placebo periods.
Next, we split our crisis period into two separate periods of equal length: the early ( . We refer to this as our early-crisis regression. This allows us to test whether some of the effects we document in Table 2 had already started to materialize during the early stage of the crisis when banks experienced ABCP-related funding problems. 20 In addition, we compare October 2008-September 2009 (late crisis) with August 2007-July 2008 (early crisis). We refer to this as the late-crisis regression. It allows us to check whether the relationship between bank-borrower closeness and lending stability strengthened further after the fall of Lehman Brothers. 21 The first four columns of Table 3 show our baseline regression, the placebo regression, and the early and late crisis regressions. Columns 5-8 then present the results from one-sided t-tests that examine whether the coefficients of our closeness variables differ significantly between various pairs of specifications. For instance, in column 5 we test whether the coefficients in the baseline specification (column 1) are larger than those in the placebo specification (column 2). Likewise, in column 6 we test whether the coefficients in the early crisis specification (column 3) are larger than those in the placebo specification (column 2). The topmost panel of Table 3 summarizes our results for the dependent variable Sudden stop. When we compare columns 1 and 2, it becomes clear that most of our results were absent in the placebo period. The very low p-values in column 5 underline this. While Experience was correlated with growth in bank lending before the crisis, the size of the coefficient increases almost five times during the crisis. A comparison of columns 3 and 4, which is formally done in column 8, indicates that bank-borrower familiarity became particularly important after the fall of Lehman Brothers.
The second panel in Table 3 , for Volume, shows again how the correlations between bank-borrower closeness and lending stability became much larger by guest on January 28, 2013 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/ during the crisis (see the p-values in column 5). Column 8 shows that this was again mainly due to the post-Lehman Brothers period. The correlation between Distance and the change in lending becomes four times larger after the Lehman Brothers collapse compared to the placebo period. The effect for Experience almost doubles, while the impact of having a Subsidiary only becomes significant during the late crisis phase. Our results in the third panel in Table 3 are for the dependent variable Number. When we compare the effect of Distance in the late crisis with the placebo period, the statistical significance increases and the coefficient is about 1.5 times larger (significant at the 10% level). The link between Experience and the change in the Number of loans also becomes significantly larger at the height of the crisis compared to before the crisis. The impact of Subsidiary also increases during the crisis, as reflected in the magnitude of the parameters, but this increase is not always significant. The effect of Domestic banks is present before and during the early stage of the crisis but then disappears.
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Finally, the last panel in Table 3 shows the results at the bank-firm level. In contrast to the country-level regressions, where the sample of bank-country pairs remains similar across periods, here the sample of borrowers changes quite a bit across periods. This is especially true for the late-crisis regressions because only a subset of (high-quality) firms borrowed both in the early and in the latecrisis period. This partially explains why we observe only limited differences between the early and late-crisis regressions and the placebo regressions. Nevertheless, when we compare our baseline with the placebo regression, the impact of all our closeness variables (except Subsidiary) is significantly stronger during the crisis compared to the tranquil placebo period (column 5). Furthermore, the relationship between Distance and Exit is insignificant in the placebo period but marginally significant in the early (p = 0.09) and late crisis regression (p = 0.14). We therefore document a strong relationship between Distance and Exit in our baseline specification (column 1). Likewise, the relationship between Domestic banks and Exit is not significant in the placebo period but becomes important during the early crisis.
Overall, Table 3 reflects that the relationship between our four closeness variables and cross-border lending either appeared or strengthened-in economic and statistical terms-during the crisis. This supports our second scenario in which the retrenchment intensity differs between banks that lend to one and the same country and depends on how close each bank is to borrowers in that country. In the alternative scenario of a general run for the exit, one would expect that any pre-crisis correlations between closeness and credit growth would have broken down or weakened during the crisis. We find the opposite: correlations appear or strengthen during the crisis. This process started during the early stage of the crisis and increased further after the fall of Lehman Brothers. Table 4 presents a battery of robustness tests to check whether or not our main results are sensitive to changes in variable definitions or estimation techniques. For ease of comparison, columns 1, 6, 14, and 20 replicate our baseline results. First, columns 2, 7, 15, and 21 show regression results where we include syndicated lending by bank subsidiaries. So far we have focused on pure crossborder lending: loans where the nationality of the (parent) bank is different from the nationality of the borrower and where the loan is provided by the parent rather than by a subsidiary. However, in about 6% of all loans, it is a local subsidiary rather than the parent bank that holds the loan on its balance sheet. 22 When we include these loan portions, our results continue to hold. We note that GL also find a flight-home effect independent of whether they include or exclude loans by subsidiaries.
Robustness
Columns 3, 8, 16, and 22 in Table 4 [2]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] does not affect the statistical or economic significance of our closeness variables. Next, in columns 4, 9, and 17 we present results based on a sample where we exclude the quartile of bank-country pairs with the smallest number of pre-crisis loans. In this way we check whether our results are driven by artificially large changes in countries with only few pre-crisis loans. This turns out not to be the case. In columns 5, 10, 18, and 23 in Table 4 we then exclude loans that were provided to finance leveraged buyouts (LBOs) or mergers and acquisitions (M&As). To the extent that these loans are more cyclical, we may not fully control for the fall in demand for such loans during the crisis. However, when we limit our sample to loans that were used for general corporate purposes rather than restructuring activities, our results continue to hold (the coefficient for Subsidiary is estimated less precisely here).
In columns 11 and 19 in Table 4 , we do not winsorize but instead exclude all outliers in the 1 st and 99 th percentile of the distribution of Volume or Number. Our results do not appear to be sensitive to the way we handle outliers. Finally, as explained in Section 2.1, Loan Analytics only provides information on the loan breakdown for about 25% of all loans. So far we have used a rather simple rule to distribute the other 75% of the loans: we assumed that each lender provided the same amount. To minimize the risk that we introduce a measurement error by choosing a particular distribution rule, we recalculate our Volume variable using two alternative methods.
In column 12 in Table 4 , we allocate half of each loan to the arrangers and half to the participants (this reflects the average loan allocation across both lender types in our full-information sample). Within both groups we divide the loan equally. Our results remain very similar. In column 13 we use the 25% of our sample with full information to estimate a model in which the loan amount of individual lenders is the dependent variable. As explanatory variables, we use the average loan amount (loan amount divided by the number of lenders), a dummy that indicates whether a lender is an arranger or a participant, an interaction term between this arranger dummy and a variable that measures whether or not the borrower is a repeat borrower, an interaction term between the arranger dummy and a post-Lehman Brothers time dummy, and a set of bank and country dummies. We then use the estimated coefficients to predict the loan portion for those lenders for whom we do not know the actual amounts (we replace negative predicted values with zero and predicted values exceeding the total loan amount with this amount). Our results are also robust to using this alternative rule.
Extensions
Distance: Geography, culture, or institutions?
We find robust evidence for a strong negative relationship between geographical Distance and cross-border lending stability. However, cross-border lending may also be impaired by cultural and institutional differences. For instance, notwithstanding a long geographical Distance, Spanish banks may have continued to lend to Mexican firms during the financial crisis because the cultural and historical ties between both countries made Spanish banks more at ease in dealing with Mexican firms than with, say, Turkish firms (which are closer in geographical than cultural terms). Similarly, banks may feel more confident, particularly during a crisis, when lending to firms in countries where the institutional and legal environment resembles that in their home country.
To look into the relative importance of geographical, cultural, and institutional distance, we create three non-geographical distance measures: a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the home and destination country share a common language; the difference between an index of credit information availability in the home and the destination country; and the difference between an index of creditor protection in the home and the destination country.
In the even columns in Table 5 , we add these alternative distance measures to our baseline specification while we replicate our base specifications in the odd columns. It becomes clear that geographical Distance is a very robust determinant of lending stability. When we add our three cultural and institutional distance measures, geographical Distance continues to be statistically strongly related to lending stability. Moreover, the size of the coefficients is only marginally reduced.
As expected, our proxy for cultural proximity, Common language, is significantly and negatively correlated with the probability of a country-level Sudden stop, although not at the firm level. All else equal, a common language reduces the probability of a Sudden Stop by 8.4 percentage points. When home and destination countries share a Common language, the change in the Amount and Number of cross-border loans during the crisis was substantially higher too. We find similar results for the two measures of institutional distance: Dif credit information and Dif creditor protection. Cross-border lending is less stable if banks are protected less in the destination country compared to what they are used to in their home country and when less creditor information is available in the destination compared to the home country. A one-standarddeviation increase in Dif credit information (Dif creditor protection) increased the probability of a Sudden Stop by 6.7 (6.6) percentage points. In conclusion, cross-border credit is more stable when banks and borrowers are geographically, culturally, and institutionally closer.
Bank, borrower, and country heterogeneity
The importance of bank-borrower closeness for cross-border lending stability may vary across different types of borrowers and destination countries, as well as across different types of lenders. If closeness allows banks to rely more on lending relationships and to generate information about new borrowers, this may be particularly important when lending to opaque borrowers in difficult lending environments. To see whether this is the case, we exploit such heterogeneity in Table 6 . We first analyze whether the extent to which banks reduced their cross-border lending during the crisis varied across different borrower groups. In columns 1-2 in Table 6 , we compare the importance of closeness for lending to firsttime versus repeat borrowers. We define first-time borrowers as those firms in country j that had never borrowed from bank i before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Repeat borrowers are firms in country j to whom bank i had lent at least once between 2000 and the start of the sample period. We include two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable captures lending to first-time borrowers and a second one for lending to repeat borrowers. 23 We interact the closeness variables with a dummy that is one if the observation concerns lending to first-time borrowers. If loans to repeat borrowers are plagued by fewer agency problems, we expect closeness to have less impact on the reduction in cross-border lending. 24 However, we do not find Table 6 Closeness and cross-border bank lending stability (Borrower, bank, and country heterogeneity) [2]
[8] a clear difference in the relationship between bank-borrower closeness and the stability of credit to first-time versus repeat borrowers. 25 In columns 3-4 in Table 6 , we compare the relationship between bankborrower closeness and lending stability for lending to banks versus non-banks. We again include two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable captures lending to bank borrowers and a second one for lending to non-bank borrowers. We interact the closeness variables with a dummy that is one if the observation concerns lending to bank borrowers.
Compared to other sectors, banks are intrinsically difficult to screen and monitor since they themselves are delegated monitors of a portfolio of subprojects (Diamond 1984) . Agency problems in inter-bank lending are difficult to resolve as there is not one (physical) project or factory that a potential lender can visit and inspect. Due diligence of a bank borrower is a more onerous process that involves assessing the bank's risk and operational systems, as well as the quality of a sample of the loan book. A bank's high leverage exacerbates these agency problems (Morgan 2002) . During the crisis, short-term inter-bank lending virtually dried up in many countries and the extreme rise in uncertainty also had repercussions for longer-term inter-bank lending.
In line with this reasoning, Table 6 shows that bank-borrower closeness matters less for inter-bank lending. Distance, Experience, and cooperation with Domestic banks appear to be less important for lending to banks. This suggests that the "rules of the game" in inter-bank lending were different after the collapse of Lehman Brothers: agency problems and mistrust in the interbank market may simply have been too severe for banks to mitigate them in a meaningful way.
Next, we focus on lender heterogeneity by analyzing whether bank-borrower closeness mattered more for arrangers than for participants. The former take the lead in negotiating the lending terms with the borrower and in performing the due diligence, while the latter have a more passive role. Although banks specialize to some extent in either of these functions, there is substantial variation over time in the role that banks play in subsequent syndications. So far, we have not distinguished much between both types of roles that lenders can play. 26 When constructing our dependent variables, we aggregated all lending by a bank to a country regardless of whether or not that bank acted as an arranger or as a participant in the underlying deals.
We create two dependent variables for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable captures lending by the bank as an arranger and a second one for lending done by the bank as a participant. We then interact the four closeness variables with Arranger in columns 5-6 in Table 6 . We find some but no overwhelming evidence that closeness matters more for arrangers. A potential explanation for the absence of a clear differential impact of our closeness variables on the stability of lending is that while participants "outsource" part of the screening and monitoring to arrangers, in particular the administrative aspects, they are likely to perform independent due diligence as well. Sufi (2007, p. 642) provides evidence from practitioner interviews to this effect: "Two main factors drive participation in syndicates, specifically, the quality of the firm and how well the participant bank 'knows' the firm. The measure of information asymmetry I construct therefore attempts to capture how well participating banks know the firm absent any information relayed by the lead arranger." Indeed, Sufi then shows how information asymmetries between the participant bank and the firm influence whether a loan is provided or not. 27 Finally, we look at the impact of destination-country heterogeneity. Table 5 showed that institutional differences between home and destination countries are negatively correlated with cross-border lending stability. We now analyze whether the level of credit information and creditor protection in destination countries influences the link between closeness and credit stability.
On the one hand, it is possible that if closeness allows banks to rely more on lending relationships and to generate information about new borrowers, it may matter more in countries where less public borrower information is available, where legal protection of creditors is below par, and where loan contracts are costly to enforce (Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco 2005; Mian 2006 ). In such countries, adequate screening and monitoring may be particularly important to complement scant public information and to prevent the need to seek legal recourse. 28 We should then find a stronger relationship between closeness and cross-border lending stability to these countries.
On the other hand, bank-borrower closeness may also matter for reasons unrelated to information asymmetries. For instance, closer banks may find it easier to extract rents if nearby borrowers face lower transportation costs (Lederer and Hurter 1986) or if distant competitor banks face higher monitoring costs that they need to pass on to borrowers (Sussman and Zeira 1995; Almazan 2002) . Such issues may have been particularly relevant during the crisis when many lenders left the syndications market and remaining banks could exploit "captive" borrowers. If such effects dominate, bank-borrower closeness matters for lending stability independent of the institutional environment.
To analyze to what extent our data support the idea that closeness matters more in institutionally difficult countries, we distinguish between countries with ample versus scarce public Credit information and with strong versus weak Creditor protection (columns 7-10 in Table 6 ). 29 In both cases, a higher value of the institutional measure indicates institutions of worse quality.
When we interact our closeness variables with Creditor information or Creditor protection, our base (level) effects for Distance, Experience, and Domestic banks continue to hold (although the coefficients for the latter variable are in some cases estimated imprecisely). For instance, regardless of how creditor-friendly the institutional framework is, Distance reduces lending stability while lending Experience increases stability. Yet, while we find little unequivocal evidence that bank-borrower closeness is more important in institutionally difficult countries, a clear and interesting exception is that the presence of a Subsidiary appears to be particularly important in institutionally weak countries.
Conclusions
In the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis, the virtues and vices of financial globalization are being reevaluated. Financial linkages between countries, in particular in the form of bank lending, have been singled out as a key channel of crisis transmission and the IMF and G20 have identified the volatility of cross-border capital as a priority for global financial reform (IMF 2010). These concerns among policy makers are understandable in view of an increasing body of academic evidence that shows that international banks played a pivotal role in transmitting the Lehman Brothers shock across borders.
What has so far remained unclear is whether different banks retrenched to the same extent from any given country. When we take the perspective of a particular destination country, was there a general run for the exit or did certain banks turn out to be more stable lenders than others? This question is not only pertinent from an academic perspective but also from the viewpoint of policy makers who want to gauge international banks' commitment to their particular country. After all, sharp reversals in cross-border credit can destabilize local financial systems and exacerbate output declines if and when domestic financial systems cannot fill the gap left by international lenders.
To answer this question, we construct a detailed data set on international bank lending during the recent financial crisis and develop an empirical strategy to identify the relationship between bank-borrower closeness and the stability of bank lending. Our results show that banks continued to lend more to countries and firms they were closer to. We find a strong and robust negative link between geographical distance and lending stability. Banks also remained more committed to countries in which they had built up pre-crisis lending experience and where they were well integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders. We also find that owning a local subsidiary stabilized cross-border lending, in particular to countries with weaker institutions.
The observation that banks that are further from their customers are less reliable lenders during a crisis is in line with studies that document a persistent regional segmentation of the syndicated loan market. Carey and Nini (2007) find that borrowers tend to issue syndicated loans in their own regional market (Europe, United States, or Asia) and that banks overweight their portfolios in favor of their regional market. Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo (2007) show that information costs prevent domestic borrowers from issuing syndicated loans abroad. Our results suggest that geographical segmentation may gradually be overcome if banks build up lending relationships with local borrowers and banks.
Our results clearly bear on the policy debate on financial globalization. On the upside, financial integration can increase the quality and quantity of financial services available to firms and households, especially in emerging markets. This may stimulate domestic demand, reduce global imbalances (Pongsaparn and Unteroberdoerster 2011) , and allow countries to specialize more in line with their comparative advantage (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003) . Yet, shocks at the core of the global financial system may make cross-border lending fickle and sudden stops can have devastating consequences for local economies. Can countries reap the benefits of financial integration while reducing negative side effects? This paper provides a number of insights to help answer this question.
First, our findings indicate that financial integration is a gradual process. Through fostering lending relationships with domestic borrowers and banks, international banks become more embedded in a local economy. We find that such entrenched banks are less likely to "run." This may partly explain why periods of rapid credit inflows often turn to busts: banks have not had the time to forge durable lending relationships. Macro-prudential policies to manage lending inflows may therefore make sense if they allow for a more gradual deepening of such relationships.
A second and related implication is that it matters which banks lend to a country. A country's vulnerability to capital outflows depends on the geographical proximity and experience of its creditors. For countries and firms that depend on banks that are remote and have less local experience, the risk of a significant homebound retrenchment by foreign lenders will be higher, all else equal.
Third, we find that international banks with a local presence tend to be more stable lenders in countries with relatively weak institutional environments. In such countries, trustworthy public or "outside" borrower information is less readily available, creditors are legally less well protected, and banks may be less successful in recovering bad loans. For countries that are considering opening their banking system, this implies that stimulating banks to "set up shop" may kill two birds with one stone. Not only do foreign-bank subsidiaries provide for a relatively stable credit source themselves, but their presence may also stabilize cross-border debt flows.
Finally, our findings suggest that local financial development remains important and funding cannot be completely "outsourced" to foreign lenders. Domestic banks that are close to local borrowers may continue to have a comparative advantage in screening and monitoring them. Their ability to do so may, however, usefully be leveraged by co-lending with international banks. Volume of cross-border lending measures the total volume of crossborder syndicated lending to the country by the banks in our sample in U.S. dollar millions. Number of crossborder loans measures the number of cross-border loans to the country in which at least one of the banks in our sample was active. Number of cross-border loan portions measures the total number of individual loan portions provided by the banks in our sample to the country (e.g., one loan with five lenders of which three foreign lenders implies three loan portions). Number of active banks measures the number of different banks that were at least three times as active as cross-border lenders in the country in the pre-crisis period. 
